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Identifying patterns of biased cognitive processing speciﬁc to depression has proved difﬁcult. The
tripartite model of mood disorders [Clark, L. A., & Watson, D. (1991). Tripartite model of anxiety and
depression: psychometric evidence and taxonomic implications. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100,
316–336] suggests that a clearer processing ‘blueprint’ may emerge if depression is viewed dimen-
sionally rather than categorically and by focusing on variations in the degree of positive, rather than
negative, processing bias. To investigate this possibility, the present study examined the extent to which
a reduced positive self-judgment bias previously found in depressed individuals relates to depression-
speciﬁc anhedonic symptoms. Sixty participants with varying levels of anxiety and depression symptoms
evaluated their own performance on a working memory task in the absence of external feedback. Overall,
participants showed a positive self-judgment bias, overestimating the number of trials they had per-
formed correctly relative to objective criteria. Consistent with the tripartite framework, the extent of this
positive self-judgment bias was signiﬁcantly and uniquely related to depression-speciﬁc symptoms, with
the positive bias reducing as anhedonia severity increased across three different symptom measures.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
A central theme of contemporary emotion research is that
biased cognitive processing is an intrinsic component of emotional
disorders (Mineka, Rafaeli, & Yovel, 2003). Similarly, a core tenet of
cognitive treatments for mood disorders is that identifying and
normalising biased processing can ameliorate symptoms (Clark,
Beck, & Alford, 1999). Considerable effort has therefore been made
to identify any unique cognitive proﬁles associated with different
forms of emotional disorder, both to aid differential diagnosis and
to help with the development of more effective clinical interven-
tions. This has particularly been the case for anxiety and depression
(Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997), amongst the most
common yet debilitating conditions seen in routine clinical
practice.
This cognitive proﬁling addresses two different questions: ﬁrst,
whether depressed individuals are more likely to exhibit a bias for
depression-relevant information, and anxious individuals for725; fax: þ44 01223 359062.
k (B.D. Dunn), lawrencead@
cam.ac.uk (T. Dalgleish).
Y license.anxiety-related information, than vice versa (‘content’ speciﬁcity);
second, whether depression is characterised by bias in particular
cognitive processes that are not altered in anxiety, and vice versa
(‘process’ speciﬁcity).
There is growing support for content-speciﬁcity, with depres-
sion being associated particularly with a focus on themes of loss
and failure and anxiety leading to a preoccupation with psycho-
logical or physical threat (e.g. Clark, Beck, & Stewart, 1990; Ingram,
Kendall, Smith, Donnell & Ronan,1987; for a review see Beck, 2005).
The case for process-speciﬁcity is less certain. Equivocal results
have emerged from an extensive literature examining a range of
cognitive processes in the affective disorders, including judgment
biases (interpreting ambiguous information in a positive or nega-
tive direction) and attention and memory biases (showing prefer-
ential attention or recall of positive or negatively valenced
material).
In the judgment domain, diagnoses of depression or anxiety
have both been associated with negative interpretation of ambig-
uous information (e.g. Butler and Mathews, 1987; Eysenck, Mogg,
May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; Lawson, McLeod, & Hammond,
2002) but there is little solid evidence of disorder speciﬁcity
(Mineka et al., 2003). In the attention andmemory domain, anxiety
disorders have been reliably associated with attentional biases
1 Recent evidence suggests, however, that anxious arousal is more speciﬁcally
related to panic than to anxiety generally and that anhedonia symptoms may be
associated with social phobia as well as depression (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow,
1998; Mineka et al., 1998).
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material), with an inconsistent picture emerging regarding
memory biases. In depression the converse has generally been
found, with reliable evidence for memory biases (preferential recall
of negative material) but mixed evidence regarding attentional
biases (Mineka et al., 2003; Williams et al., 1997). Given these
inconsistent yet sometimes positive patterns of memory biases in
anxious groups and attentional biases in depressed groups, it is
difﬁcult to argue that these information processing styles can fully
and satisfactorily differentiate between diagnoses of anxiety and
depression.
Perhaps the strongest way to investigate processing speciﬁcity
at the diagnostic level is to examine ‘pure’ anxious and depressed
individuals on the same task(s) within the same experiment. Only
a relatively small subset of studies have adopted this approach,
however (e.g. Bradley, Mogg, & Williams, 1995; Dalgleish et al.,
2003; Dozois & Dobson, 2001; Dozois & Frewen, 2006; Heidenreich,
Junghanns-Royack, & Stangier, 2007; Lim & Kim, 2005; Mathews,
Ridgeway, & Williamson, 1996; Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995;
Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000; Rinck & Becker, 2005) and even
fewer have demonstrated clear processing speciﬁcity effects, not all
of which are readily interpretable in the light of the previous
literature. The relative dearth of these studies is likely to in part
reﬂect the difﬁculty in recruiting ‘pure’ depressed and anxious
populations.
In summary, experimental attempts to identify unique cognitive
processing proﬁles that can distinguish depression and anxiety at
the level of diagnosis havemet withmixed results to date and there
is a clear need for further research, to aid both theory and clinical
practice. This is the aim of the present study.
These existing attempts to demonstrate processing speciﬁcity
for anxiety and depression have almost invariably been under-
pinned by the current DSM diagnostic classiﬁcation system (or sub-
clinical analogues thereof), which presupposes that psychological
distress can be classiﬁed into distinct types on the basis of criteria
lists with unique deﬁning features (e.g. ‘‘depressed’’, ‘‘anxious’’, or
‘‘healthy’’). It is, however, increasingly a matter for debate whether
such clear divisions exist between different emotional disorders.
This is particularly the case for anxiety and depression, given the
high levels of comorbidity between them, the tendency for indi-
viduals to move between diagnostic classes over relatively short
time spans, and the frequent ‘boundary disputes’ that occur about
how best to classify presentations that fall between categories
(Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998; Widiger & Samuel, 2005).
Therefore, the case has been made that mental health
complaints may be better conceptualised as at least partly dimen-
sional rather than fully categorical constructs, with individuals
falling somewhere on a series of approximately normally distrib-
uted and overlapping continua ranging from symptom free to
highly symptomatic (e.g., Watson, 2005; Watson & Clark, 2006).
Some of these symptom dimensions are relatively common across
diagnoses, whereas others are relatively speciﬁc to a given diag-
nosis. For example, the inﬂuential tripartite framework (Clark &
Watson, 1991; Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994) proposes that the
symptoms of depression and anxiety are captured by three
dimensions. Common to both conditions is ‘general distress’, con-
sisting of non-speciﬁc ‘Negative Affect’ symptoms (e.g., depressed
mood, anxious mood, insomnia). Unique to anxiety is physiological
hyper-arousal and somatic tension (e.g., dizziness, shortness of
breath), whereas unique to depression are ‘Positive Affect’ symp-
toms of anhedonia and apathy (e.g., loss of interest, feeling nothing
is enjoyable). The Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire
(MASQ; Watson & Clark, 1991; Watson, Weber, Assenheimer, Clark,
Strauss, & McCormick, 1995) was developed as a self-report
measure of these three symptom clusters and factor analyticstudies have generally supported this conceptualisation (Mineka
et al., 1998).1
It is perhaps unsurprising that reliably demonstrating process-
ing bias speciﬁcity in anxiety and depression at the level of diag-
nosis has proved somewhat elusive, given the common ‘Negative
Affect’ core the tripartite model postulates they share. Instead, it
may be more fruitful to see if there are unique processing proﬁles
associated with the putative depression-speciﬁc (anhedonia) and
anxiety-speciﬁc (hyper-arousal) symptom dimensions. Surpris-
ingly, this possibility has received relatively little research attention
to date (for exceptions see Larson, Nitschke, & Davidson, 2007;
Yovel & Mineka 2004, 2005).
The tripartite framework also raises another possible reason as to
why previous attempts to identify cognitive distinctions between
anxietyanddepressionat the categorical level havenot beenentirely
successful. Existing studies have tended to focus predominantly on
negative information processing biases, for example processing that
favours negative (relative to neutral) cue words or negative evalu-
ations of ambiguous events. However, if processing speciﬁcity in any
way mirrors the speciﬁcity of symptom clusters, as outlined in the
tripartite model, then such negative biases are likely to be common
to both anxiety and depression. In contrast, a reduction in the extent
of any positive bias may be uniquely associated with depression.
There is some support in the literature for an association
between reduction in positive bias and depression assessed as
a categorical diagnostic construct. While healthy individuals show
a number of protective positive biases, for example over-estimating
their degree of control and performance in a range of scenarios
(Taylor & Brown, 1988; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004),
depressed individuals show a less positive (and more realistic)
estimation of control (e.g. ‘depressive realism’; Alloy & Abramson,
1979; for a review see Haaga & Beck, 1995). Further, healthy indi-
viduals exhibit an attentional bias towards positive stimuli and/or
away from negative stimuli, whereas depressed and dysphoric
individuals exhibit ‘even-handed’ attentional deployment to posi-
tive and negative stimuli (e.g., Gotlib, McLachlan, & Katz, 1988;
McCabe, Gotlib, & Martin, 2000; McCabe & Toman, 2000). Finally,
while healthy individuals recall more positive than negative
experimentally presented stimuli, depressed individuals recall
similar numbers of positive and negative, or more negative than
positive, stimuli (so-called ‘mood congruent recall effects’; for
reviews see Blaney, 1986; Matt, Va´zquez, & Campbell, 1992).
Surprisingly, the speciﬁcity of these blunted positive bias ﬁnd-
ings to depression, versus anxiety, has been investigated in rela-
tively few studies to date and where such an approach has been
adopted somewhat equivocal ﬁndings have emerged. Individuals
with ‘pure’ or mixed depression were shown to endorse fewer
positive adjectives as self descriptive, subsequently recall fewer of
these positive items, and demonstrate less positive attribute
redundancy, relative to ‘pure’ anxiety and control groups (Dozois &
Dobson, 2001). However, there were no group differences for
interference effects to positive words on the emotional Stroop task
or for interconnectedness of positive interpersonal content in this
study. Later investigations did ﬁnd reduced interconnectedness for
positive interpersonal content in depressed individuals, relative to
healthy control participants and a mixed anxiety control group
(Dozois & Frewen, 2006), although this proﬁle did not show spec-
iﬁcity to depression in that similar ﬁndings emerged for a sample
with social phobia.
2 It could be argued that the current experimental rationale is somewhat
tautological in nature in that it simply aims to demonstrate that subjective symp-
toms of blunted positivity are correlated with objective measures of blunted
positive information processing. In our view however it is theoretically and clini-
cally useful to distinguish between accurate description of phenomenology (in this
case anhedonic symptoms of depression) and detailed identiﬁcation of the infor-
mation processing mechanisms that might underpin this (in this case, reduced
positive self-judgment bias). By identifying both phenomenology and mechanism it
is possible to develop a more helpful model of disorder maintenance and to devise
effective interventions. For example, a large body of work has established that
negative judgment bias mechanisms are related to negative affect symptoms across
a range of mood disorders (for a review see Mineka et al., 2003) and this has formed
the basis of cognitive interventions for these conditions.
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memory (i.e. a reduction in the number of anticipated positive
events) and impaired recall of happy faces may be characteristic of
mixed depression and anxiety but not pure anxiety (McLeod &
Byrne, 1996; Gilboa-Schechtman, Erhard-Weiss, & Jeczemien,
2002). These studies did not however include a pure depressed
group, weakening the support they can offer for the process spec-
iﬁcity hypothesis.
In summary, these diagnostic studies have revealed promising,
albeit equivocal, evidence for positive processing alterations being
speciﬁc to depression. As detailed above, clearer support for attenu-
ation of positive bias being speciﬁc to depressionmay be revealed by
adopting a dimensional rather than diagnostic framework. However,
as far as we are aware, no studies have yet taken this approach.
The present study is therefore an investigation of whether it is
possible to separate depression more clearly from anxiety with
respect to biased cognitive mechanisms when conceptualising the
constructs in dimensional rather than categorical terms, and when
focusing on variations in positive rather than in negative informa-
tion processing biases.
To assess positive information processing biases we used
a measure of self-regulatory judgment accuracy. A core presenting
feature of mood disorders is the inability to regulate the self, where
individuals report becoming overly internally preoccupied, experi-
ence unwanted negative affect, ﬁnd it difﬁcult to make decisions,
and ruminate about their mood rather than responding adaptively
to the demands of the environment (Gotlib &Hammen,1992). These
symptoms have been partly understood in terms of disturbances of
a self-regulatory system (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Duval &Wicklund,
1972), whereby individuals iteratively evaluate the extent to which
actual statusmatches ideal status on a self-relevant dimensionusing
a ‘test-operate-test-exit’ (TOTE) function (Miller, Galanter, & Pri-
bram, 1960). If current status falls short of the ideal goal individuals
experience negative affect, motivating them to change their
behaviour and then re-evaluate the consequences. At the point
when the discrepancy between actual and ideal status is sufﬁciently
small, the individual exits this cycle. In depression it is argued that
individuals somehowbecome ‘locked’ in self-regulatory cycles,with
unfavourable actual-ideal comparisons intensifying negative affect,
lowering self-esteem, and impairing adaptive behaviour (Higgins,
1987; Ingram, 1990; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987).
This difﬁculty in exiting self-regulatory cycles in depressionmay
reﬂect an underlying bias in the way ideal-actual judgments are
made (either showing an exaggerated negative or a reduced posi-
tive bias, relative to healthy individuals). To examine this issue we
asked participants in a previous study to evaluate their own
performance on a difﬁcult spatial working memory task in the
absence of any external feedback (B. D. Dunn, Dalgleish, Lawrence,
& Ogilvie, 2007), therefore requiring them tomake a self-regulatory
judgment. Healthy control participants signiﬁcantly over-estimated
the proportion of trials they performed correctly, consistent with
a positive judgment bias. Both dysphoric (Study 1: n ¼ 20 per
group) and clinically depressed (Study 2: n ¼ 25 per group) indi-
viduals also displayed a positive judgment bias. However, the
magnitude of this positive bias was signiﬁcantly decreased, sug-
gesting that depressed individuals may become locked in self-
regulatory cycles because they are more sensitive in detecting
a discrepancy between ideal and actual status.
For the purposes of the present study, this paradigm provides
a robust measure of judgment bias, determining whether individ-
uals overestimate (i.e. are positively biased), underestimate (i.e. are
negatively biased), or are accurate about their performance in an
ambiguous context where no feedback is provided. Importantly, the
paradigm controls for a range of criticisms levelled against other
positive judgment bias measures (e.g. contingency judgments;Haaga & Beck, 1995). First, bias is assessed relative to an objective
performance baseline, making it possible to determine the absolute
accuracy of judgments. Second, the same bias pattern is found in
both dysphoric and clinically depressed populations, ruling out the
possibility that thepatternof results is only found inmilddepression
and that a negative bias emerges in more severe cases. Third, task
difﬁculty is titrated (increasing or decreasing the memory span
depending on performance on the previous trial), thereby holding
all participants at the upper ranges of their memory capacity. This
means that altered judgment is not simply a consequence of the task
being more effortful or demanding for depressed participants rela-
tive to control participants. This task therefore provides a sensible
candidate measure to examine the extent to which the anxiety and
depression speciﬁc dimensions of the tripartitemodel are related to
variations in a positive judgment bias.
In the current study we employed a correlational design and
administered this self-judgment task toparticipantspresentingwith
a range of mixed mood disorder symptoms, from relatively
symptom-free up to clinical levels. We examined the relationship
betweenmagnitude of positive bias and the symptomdimensions of
the tripartite model (indexed using the short form of the MASQ
[MASQ-S]; Watson & Clark, 1991). To further validate these results
we performed similar analyses using anhedonia-related subscales of
theBeckDepression Inventory (BDI-I;Beck,Ward,Mendelson,Mock,
& Erbaugh, 1961) and the Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), two of
themostwidelyusedmeasures of dysphoric andanxious symptoms.
We had three hypotheses. First, based on literature arguing that
healthy individuals display a range of protective ‘positive illusions’
(e.g. Taylor & Brown,1988;Mezulis et al., 2004) and on our previous
results (B. D. Dunn et al., 2007), we expected participants in general
to show a positive bias on the task, over-estimating how well they
were performing (Hypothesis 1). Next, we predicted that the extent
of this positive distortion bias would decrease as anxious/
depressed symptoms increased (Hypothesis 2). Finally, in line with
the tripartite framework (Clark &Watson, 1991), we envisaged that
symptoms speciﬁc to depression (anhedonia items from the MASQ,
BDI-I and STAI) would account for this reduction in positive bias
(Hypothesis 3). We addressed this in two ways. We initially
examined whether the correlation between the anhedonia and
positive bias was signiﬁcantly stronger than the correlation
between the remaining items and positive bias on all three scales.
We then examined whether anhedonia remained signiﬁcantly
related to degree of positive bias, after partialling out scores on the
remaining items on all three scales.2
Method
Participants
Sixty participants (44 women) aged 18–65 years (M ¼ 43.98;
SD ¼ 15.00) with no history of brain injury, psychosis, learning
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semi-structured interview enquiring about mental health and
neurological history, current medications, and demographic char-
acteristics). Individuals were selected from a database of commu-
nity volunteers, which holds scores on dysphoria (BDI-I) and
anxiety (STAI) measures from the previous occasion that individ-
uals participated in a research study, thereforemaking it possible to
ensure a broad range of anxiety and depression symptoms in the
sample.3 Six participants were taking anti-depressant medication
(ﬁve using SSRIs, one using a tricyclic). The mean estimated full
scale IQ according to the National Adult Reading Test (NART;
Nelson, 1982) was 116.15 (SD ¼ 6.03). Participants gave written
informed consent, were reimbursed the equivalent of US$10 per
hour for their time, and the study was approved by the local
research ethics committee.
Self-judgment accuracy task
As in our previous study (B. D. Dunn et al., 2007), self-judgment
was indexed in terms of participants’ accuracy in evaluating their
own performance on a computerised spatial working memory task.
On each of 20 trials, 8 red boxes were shown in ﬁxed random
positions on a black screen and a variable number of these boxes
changed colour (to blue) in turn in a randomised order. After the
boxes had ﬁnished changing colour, participants repeated the
colour change sequence by clicking on each box in turn. At the end
of each trial, they judged whether they had repeated the sequence
correctly, in the absence of external feedback. The difﬁculty of the
task was titrated to rule out performance confounds. Successful
reproduction of a sequence led to an increase in the length of the
sequence on the next trial, whereas incorrect reproduction led to
a decrease (minimum sequence length ¼ one, maximum sequence
length ¼ eight, ﬁrst trial sequence length ¼ ﬁve). This was designed
to keep all participants at the upper end of their memory ability.
This pattern was not explained to participants and none reported
having noticed it when asked at the end of the experiment.
Participants completed two practice trials to familiarise themselves
with the task. Analysis focused on participants’ evaluation of their
performance relative to objective criteria. This ‘distortion’ bias
(from 1 to þ1) was the proportion of trials estimated as per-
formed correctly minus the proportion of trials actually performed
correctly. A positive score therefore represents a positive distortion
bias, participants judging that they performed more trials correctly
than they actually did (for full task details, see B. D. Dunn et al.,
2007).
Symptom measures
The 62-item MASQ-S (Watson & Clark, 1991) was used to index
depression-speciﬁc and anxiety-speciﬁc symptoms. Participants
are asked to judge to what extent they have felt the way described
in each question for the past week, ranging from one (not at all) to3 To ensure a good spread of depression and anxiety symptoms in the present
sample, we requested two lists of volunteers from the participant panel, one
comprising individuals with depression and anxiety scores in the non-clinical range
and with no history of mood disorders and one comprising individuals with
depression and anxiety scores above non-clinical ranges. Thirty individuals were
recruited from each list. Given this recruitment method, it is possible that a bimodal
distribution might have been obtained. However, exploratory data analysis revealed
that MASQ-S total scores were normally distributed across the sample,
kurtosis¼ .64, skewness¼ .33, Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of normality (59) ¼ .11,
P > .05. Further, participants recruited from either list did not signiﬁcantly differ in
terms of age, NART estimated intelligence, ts < 1, or gender ratios, c2 < 1, sug-
gesting that those with more extreme scores did not represent a unique sample in
terms of other characteristics (cf. Coyne, 1994).ﬁve (extremely). The MASQ-S comprises three factors. The general
distress (GD) subscale has 11 items reﬂecting anxious mood (e.g.
‘‘felt nervous’’) and 12 items reﬂecting depressed mood (e.g. ‘‘felt
sad’’), none of which strongly differentiates anxiety and depression
(total score ¼ 115). The anxious arousal (AA) subscale comprises 17
items assessing somatic tension and hyper-arousal (e.g. ‘‘was
trembling or shaking’’), which are believed to be relatively anxiety-
speciﬁc (total score ¼ 85). The anhedonic depression (AD) subscale
has 8 questions assessing experiences believed to be speciﬁc to
depression, including itemsmeasuring loss of pleasure and interest
(e.g. ‘‘felt like nothing was very enjoyable’’) and 14 reverse keyed
items assessing positive emotional experience (e.g. ‘‘felt cheerful’’)
(total score ¼ 110). The satisfactory reliability and validity of the
MASQ-S has beenwell documented. In the present sample, internal
reliability was acceptable for all three factors (Cronbach’s a for
AD ¼ .94; for GD ¼ .92; for AA ¼ .83).
As additional measures of anxiety and dysphoria symptoms for
examining Hypotheses Two and Three, participants completed the
STAI state and trait scales (Spielberger et al., 1983) and the BDI-I
(Beck et al., 1961). Previous studies suggest that these scales can
also be sub-divided into anhedonic and non-anhedonic symptom
clusters, even though this was not the primary intentionwhen they
were designed.
A factor analysis of the STAI trait scale (STAI-T) on a sample of
212 participants with mixed anxiety disorder diagnoses imple-
mented by Bieling, Antony, and Swinson (1998) found a two
dimension solution: a ‘‘depression’’ factor indexing symptoms
related to blunted positive affect (items 1, 3–7, 10, 12, 16–19;
Cronbach’s a ¼ .88) and an ‘‘anxiety’’ factor measuring symptoms
of elevated negative affect (items 2, 8–9, 11, 13–15, 20; Cronbach’s
a ¼ .78). For the purposes of the current study, the ‘‘depression’’
factor is used as a measure of anhedonia and is compared to the
‘‘anxiety’’ factor. Both factors displayed satisfactory internal
consistency in the present sample (Cronbach’s a ¼ .92 for
‘‘depression’’ items and .85 for ‘‘anxiety’’ items).
We were unable to ﬁnd published factor analytic studies of the
STAI state scale (STAI-S) and therefore selected items measuring
reduced ‘‘positive affect’’ identiﬁed by informal content analysis by
Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) (items 2, 8, 11, 16, 20) as our
measure of anhedonia and contrasted this to the remaining ‘‘other’’
STAI-S items. Internal consistency of these subscales in the present
sample was also adequate (Cronbach’s a ¼ .80 for reduced ‘‘positive
affect’’ items and .85 for remaining ‘‘other’’ items).
A factor analysis of the BDI-I conducted by Dunn et al. (2002) on
63 affective disorder patients (as part of a brain imaging study)
revealed a ﬁve factor solution, including a ‘‘psychomotor anhe-
donia’’ factor (items 4,11–13 and 15). We contrasted this ‘‘psycho-
motor anhedonia’’ factor to the remaining ‘‘other’’ items in the
present study. Cronbach’s a for the ‘‘psychomotor anhedonia’’ and
‘‘other’’ factors (.79 and .83 respectively) again fell within accept-
able limits in the current dataset.44 The BDI-I rather than the BDI-II was selected as we were aware of a factor
analytic study that had a found an anhedonia speciﬁc dimension for the BDI-I
(Dunn et al., 2002) but do not know of any studies that have found a clear anhe-
donia factor for the BDI-II. Further, our subject panel stores BDI-I rather than BDI-II
data for historical reasons. These BDI-I results need to be interpreted cautiously
however, as the Dunn et al. (2002) factor analysis was conducted on a relatively
small sample and generated a somewhat unclean factor solution. Further, the size
of the correlation with the MASQ-S AD factor was comparable for the BDI-I anhe-
donia and ‘‘other’’ items in the present sample (see Table 1), suggesting that it is not
a particularly sensitive measure of the anhedonic symptoms of depression. It will
be important to replicate these results using the BDI-II and other measures of
depression. In contrast, the anhedonia items extracted from the STAI-T and STAI-S
had larger correlations with MASQ-S AD factor than did the remaining ‘‘other’’
items on both scales, suggesting they are adequate measures of anhedonia.
Table 1
Distortion and mood symptoms correlations (N ¼ 59).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Distortion (1) r
P
MASQ-S total (2) r 0.29
P 0.01*
MASQ-S GD (3) r 0.18 0.94
P 0.19 0.00
MASQ-S AA (4) r 0.06 0.60 0.51
P 0.66 0.00 0.00
MASQ-S AD (5) r 0.41 0.93 0.81 0.35
P 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.01
STAI-T (6) r 0.38 0.87 0.80 0.41 0.87
P 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
STAI-T ‘‘anxiety’’ (7) r 0.26 0.77 0.71 0.38 0.76 0.90
P 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
STAI-T ‘‘depression’’ (8) r 0.42 0.85 0.78 0.39 0.86 0.97 0.77
P 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
STAI-S (9) r 0.20 0.74 0.71 0.47 0.65 0.69 0.62 0.68
P 0.07* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
STAI-S reduced ‘‘positive affect’’ (10) r 0.30 0.69 0.63 0.36 0.68 0.73 0.59 0.75 0.90
P 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
STAI-S ‘‘other’’ (11) r 0.14 0.71 0.71 0.49 0.60 0.64 0.60 0.60 0.98 0.80
P 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BDI-I (12) r 0.23 0.82 0.76 0.39 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.58 0.56 0.56
P 0.04* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BDI-I ‘‘psychomotor anhedonia’’ (13) r 0.34 0.72 0.62 0.37 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.67 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.89
P 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BDI-I ‘‘other’’ (14) r 0.17 0.80 0.78 0.37 0.77 0.75 0.70 0.71 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.98 0.78
P 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Distortion ¼ proportion of trials judged as correct minus proportion of trials performed correctly. MASQ-S ¼Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire-Short Form. Total
score correlations are presented along with correlations for the anhedonia (AD), anxious arousal (AA), and general distress (GD) factors. STAI ¼ Spielberger State Trait Anxiety
Inventory. State (-S) and trait (-T) total score correlations are presented along with correlations for trait sub-scale scores for ‘‘anxiety’’ and ‘‘depression’’ items (Bieling et al.,
1998) and state sub-scale scores for reduced ‘‘positive affect’’ and ‘‘other’’ items (Mathews &Mackintosh, 2000). BDI-I ¼ Beck Depression Inventory. Total score correlations are
presented along with correlations for sub-scales of ‘‘psychomotor anhedonia’’ and ‘‘other’’ symptoms (Dunn et al., 2002).
*P values are one-tailed as correlations examine a priori hypotheses.
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Participants were screened and the NART, STAI, BDI-I andMASQ-
S were administered in turn. Volunteers then completed the self-
judgment task, along with other measures not described here.
Testing took place in a quiet, softly lit room, with participants
seated in a comfortable chair facing the computer monitor.
Results
For all analyses, alpha was set at .05. Statistical tests examining
a priori hypotheses are directional and are noted as such in the text.
Other tests are two-tailed. One participant’s distortion score was an
outlier and so was set aside from the analysis.
Participants completed approximately half of the sequences
correctly on the self-judgment task (M ¼ 0.52; SD ¼ 0.04), indi-
cating that task titrationwas successful, with a mean span length of
5.38 (SD ¼ 0.60). There was no signiﬁcant relationship between
total scores on any of the moodmeasures and either meanmemory
sequence length or the proportion of sequences performed
correctly, Ps > .30, suggesting that mood disorder symptom
severity did not inﬂuence memory performance.
As predicted in Hypothesis 1, most participants (92%) showed
a positive distortion bias, and mean over-estimation of the
proportion of sequences they repeated correctly (M ¼ 0.23,
SD ¼ 0.15) was signiﬁcantly different from zero, t(58) ¼ 11.83,
P < .001, one-tailed, d ¼ 1.54 (Cohen, 1988).
There was a broad spread of mood symptom scores across the
sample as intended (MASQ-S total: M ¼ 122.08, SD ¼ 31.14, range
72–203; BDI-I: M ¼ 9.18, SD ¼ 7.77, range 0–35; STAI trait:
M ¼ 42.41, SD ¼ 11.47, range 20–67; STAI state: M ¼ 34.98,
SD ¼ 9.90, range 20–76). The relationships between the variousmood disorder symptom measures and distortion are shown in
Table 1.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, as symptom severity increased
the extent of the positive distortion bias decreased. This was
signiﬁcant for: MASQ total score, r ¼ .29, P ¼ .02, one-tailed; STAI
trait, r ¼ .38, P < .001, one-tailed; BDI-I total score, r ¼ .23,
P ¼ .04, one-tailed; and showed a trend towards signiﬁcance for
STAI state, r ¼ .20, P ¼ .07, one-tailed. Further, a multiple corre-
lation computed across measures, entering distortion as the inde-
pendent variable and BDI-I, STAI state, STAI trait and MASQ total
scores as the independent variables in a regression analysis, was
also signiﬁcant, R(4,54) ¼ .41, P ¼ .02, one-tailed.
To examine Hypothesis 3, we ﬁrst explored the relationship of
distortion to the MASQ-S AD subscale compared with the associa-
tion between distortion and the other MASQ-S factors (see Table 1
and Fig. 1). Consistent with predictions, there was a moderate and
signiﬁcant negative correlation between distortion and AD,
r ¼ .41, P < .001, one-tailed, a small and non-signiﬁcant correla-
tion between distortion and GD, r ¼ .18, P ¼ .19, and a trivial and
non-signiﬁcant correlation between distortion and AA, r ¼ .06,
P ¼ .66. As predicted, the magnitude of distortion correlations was
signiﬁcantly greater for AD than for the remaining MASQ items
(pooling AA and GD), t(56) ¼ 2.94, P ¼ .002, one-tailed, d ¼ .79.
Moreover, the distortion-AD correlation was large and signiﬁcant
even after partialling out the remaining MASQ items, rp ¼ .46,
P < .001, one-tailed.
Next, we explored the relationship of distortion with the
anhedonia items extracted from the STAI-T, STAI-S and BDI-I. STAI-T
items assessing ‘‘depression’’ symptoms (Bieling et al., 1998)
showed a moderate and signiﬁcant negative correlation with
distortion, r ¼ .42, P ¼ .001, one-tailed. While the remaining STAI-
Trait ‘‘anxiety’’ items also showed a moderate signiﬁcant
Fig. 1. The relationship of distortion with MASQ-S general distress, anxious arousal
and anhedonic depression factors (N ¼ 59). Note: Scale scores are transformed into
percentage of maximum factor score to aid visual comparison. Statistical analyses used
untransformed factor scores.
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correlation was signiﬁcantly smaller than for the ‘‘depression’’
items, t(56) ¼ 1.91, P ¼ .03, one-tailed, d ¼ .51. The correlation of
distortion with the ‘‘depression’’ factor remained moderate and
signiﬁcant when partialling out the effects of the remaining
‘‘anxiety’’ items, rp ¼ .37, P < . 01, one-tailed, whereas notably the
‘‘anxiety’’ items correlation with distortion was small and non-
signiﬁcant when partialling out the effects of ‘‘depression’’ items,
rp ¼ .12, P ¼ .36.
STAI-S items measuring reduced ‘‘positive affect’’ (Mathews &
Mackintosh, 2000), were moderately and signiﬁcantly associated
with distortion, r ¼ .30, P ¼ .01, one-tailed, whereas the remaining
STAI-S items showed a small and non-signiﬁcant correlation,
r ¼ .14, P ¼ .27, with the magnitude of these correlations again
differing signiﬁcantly, t(56) ¼ 2.01, P ¼ .024, one-tailed, d ¼ .54.
Reduced ‘‘positive affect’’ was still moderately and signiﬁcantly
related to distortion when partialling out the remaining STAI-state
items, rp ¼ .31, P ¼ .01, one-tailed.
Finally, BDI-I items measuring ‘‘psychomotor anhedonia’’ (Dunn
et al., 2002) showed a signiﬁcant and moderate correlation with
distortion, r ¼ .34, P < .001, one-tailed, whereas the correlation
with the remaining BDI-I items was small and non-signiﬁcant,
r ¼ .17, P ¼ .20, with the magnitude of these correlations again
signiﬁcantly differing, t(56) ¼ 2.09, P ¼ .02, one-tailed, d ¼ .56. The
relationship between BDI-I anhedonia items and distortion
remained moderate and signiﬁcant even when partialling out the
remaining BDI-I items, rp ¼ .33, P ¼ .01, one-tailed.
An identical pattern of results emerged when all analyses were
repeated co-varying for gender, medication status, age and NART
estimated IQ, suggesting that the ﬁndings can in no signiﬁcant way
be accounted for by demographic confounds.
Discussion
The present study examined whether a speciﬁc cognitive pro-
cessing proﬁle for depression could be identiﬁed by adopting
a dimensional rather than categorical model of the construct and by
focusing on variations in positive, rather than negative, information
processing bias. Participants with mixed mood disorder symptomscompleted a self-judgment task, which had previously revealed
that dysphoric and depressed individuals show an attenuated, but
still positive, distortion bias relative to healthy participants (B. D.
Dunn et al., 2007).
In support of our ﬁrst hypothesis, participants reliably showed
a positive distortion bias on the task, with 92% estimating that they
had performed better than they actually had. Validating our second
hypothesis, the extent of this positive distortion bias decreased as
mood disorder symptom severity increased. This relationship was
signiﬁcant in a multiple correlation analysis across all three mood
measures with a medium effect size (Cohen, 1998). There was also
a signiﬁcant negative relationship between distortion and MASQ-S,
BDI-I and STAI-T total scores analysed individually, albeit with small
effect sizes (Cohen, 1988), and a trend towards signiﬁcance for
STAI-S scores. That the magnitude of the correlation was higher for
the three measures assessing symptoms over the past week than
for state anxiety suggests distortion is inﬂuenced more by back-
ground mood than by current emotional state.
Consistent with our third and central hypothesis, the relation-
ship between positive distortion bias on the self-judgment task and
mood disorder symptoms on the MASQ-S was found to be
predominantly governed by anhedonic symptoms speciﬁc to
depression. This was evidenced by the fact that this MASQ-S
AD-distortion negative correlation: was moderate and signiﬁcant;
was signiﬁcantly greater than the non-signiﬁcant correlations
between distortion and other MASQ-S items; and was large and
signiﬁcant after partialling out scores on these other items. Vali-
dating these results, the same picture emerged, albeit to a less clear
extent, when fractionating the BDI-I, STAI-S and STAI-T into anhe-
donic versus other symptom clusters.
That the MASQ-S ﬁndings were clearer than the BDI-I and STAI
ﬁndings for Hypothesis 3 is unsurprising as this was the only scale
that contains substantive numbers of anhedonia items, that was
speciﬁcally designed to distinguish anhedonic symptoms unique to
depression from other features of mood disorders, and for which
the factor solution has been subject to extensive psychometric
validation.
The present ﬁndings have several theoretical implications as to
how to best conceptualise depression. That a reduction in a positive
distortion bias is uniquely signiﬁcantly related to the MASQ-S AD
factor offers good support for the tripartite model (Clark & Watson,
1991). As far as we are aware this is the ﬁrst convincing demon-
stration that MASQ factors uniquely relate to underlying informa-
tion processing biases, therefore developing construct validity for
this framework (though see Larson et al., 2007 for similar work on
affective responses). This ﬁnding also suggests that viewing
depression as a dimensional rather than categorical construct may
be a particularly fruitful avenue for further revealing ‘process
speciﬁcity’ in the disorder.
The demonstration of a reduced positive self-judgment bias in
depression is broadly consistent with the wider emotional litera-
ture showing that it may be variation in blunted response to
positive stimuli rather than elevated response to negative stimuli
that is central to depression. Studies reliably demonstrate that
depressed individuals differ from control participants in terms of
reduced ratings of arousal, valence and happiness when viewing
positive material, but do not consistently differ in their subjective
ratings of negative material (e.g. Bylsma, Morris & Rottenberg,
2008; B. D. Dunn, Dalgleish, Lawrence, Cusack, & Oglivie, 2004;
Rottenberg, Kasch, Gross, & Gotlib, 2002; Sloan, Strauss, Quirk, &
Stajovik, 1997). Similarly, depressed individuals ﬁnd it more difﬁ-
cult to recognise positive than negative facial expressions (i.e.
require greater intensity of stimuli before recognition; Joormann &
Gotlib, 2006). Finally, it has recently been shown that depressed
individuals show reduced reward responsiveness on a probabilistic
B.D. Dunn et al. / Behaviour Research and Therapy 47 (2009) 374–381380reward learning task, and that this deﬁcit is to some extent asso-
ciated with symptoms of anhedonia (Pizzagalli, Iosifescu, Hallett,
Ratner, & Fava, 2009).
The current ﬁndings, if replicated and extended, also have
potential clinical relevance. They suggest that greater attention
should be paid to understanding and treating reductions in posi-
tive, as well as exaggerations in negative, responses in depression,
whether in terms of information processing bias or affective reac-
tions. Dominant theoretical models of depression acknowledge this
point to an extent. For example, classic cognitive theory identiﬁes
‘discounting the positives’ as a common thinking error in depres-
sion (e.g. Beck, 1995) and the importance of examining positive
content in models of speciﬁcity has been highlighted (Clark, Beck, &
Alford, 1999). Nevertheless, the present ﬁndings suggest that an
even stronger clinical emphasis on augmenting positivity is
required, for example utilising interventions from the positive
psychology literature in combination with conventional cognitive
therapy approaches (Seligman, Rashid, & Parks, 2006). That
depressed individuals show a positive judgment bias, albeit smaller
than that of control participants, is also interesting in the context of
‘‘reality testing’’ techniques commonly advocated in cognitive
approaches. In some scenarios use of such approaches could further
lower mood, removing a potentially protective positive bias (cf.
Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Further clariﬁcation of the mechanisms underpinning these
positive disturbances seems warranted. For example, the present
data suggest that the presence of a blunted positive self-judgment
bias could plausibly underpin the emergence of anhedonic symp-
toms. Altered perception of performance by depressed individuals
may reduce the degree of reinforcement they receive from activi-
ties of daily living. This could lead to behavioural inactivation,
including reduced participation in events that have the potential to
be positively reinforcing (e.g. Lewinsohn & Graf, 1973), and there-
fore to a loss of pleasure. Clinically this would suggest that targeting
this reduced positive self-judgment bias might facilitate behav-
ioural activation interventions for depression (for a review, see
Hopko, Lejuez, Ruggiero, & Eifert, 2003). Future research could
usefully examine the validity of this possible mechanism in an
ecologically valid setting. Similarly, it will be interesting to explore
whether reductions in positive self-judgment bias are related to
activity in the behavioural approach system (BAS; see Depue &
Iacano, 1989; Pickering and Gray, 1999), given that BAS distur-
bances have been consistently found in depression (e.g. Kasch,
Rottenberg, Arnow, & Gotlib, 2002).
The present study suffers from potential limitations. First, we
indexed positive bias solely in terms of self-judgment accuracy and
it remains to be demonstrated whether similar conclusions about
its unique association with anhedonic symptoms will emerge in
other processing domains. Second, participants were selected on
the basis of self-report of depression and anxiety symptoms on the
MASQ-S and not on symptom counts or severity scores from clinical
interviews. Because we were particularly interested in assessing
the dimensional factors identiﬁed in the tripartite model,
a continuous self-report questionnaire approach seemed optimal.
Furthermore, in our previous study (B. D. Dunn et al., 2007) we
found identical patterns of results in dysphoric participants iden-
tiﬁed using questionnaires and individuals diagnosed with Major
Depressive Disorder identiﬁed using structured clinical interviews,
and therefore feel this issue is unlikely to have unduly inﬂuenced
the results.
Third, given that we are arguing that a reduction in positive
distortion bias is uniquely associated with depression-speciﬁc
symptoms, at face value it is surprising that the distortion corre-
lationwas numerically greater for STAI-T total score (r ¼ .38) than
for the BDI-I (r ¼ .23) and MASQ (r ¼ .29) total scores. This mayreﬂect the fact that the STAI-T, whilst originally designed as
a measure of anxiety, actually includes a greater proportion of
anhedonia questions (13 out of 20 items; 65%) than both theMASQ-
S (22 out of 62 items; 35%) and the BDI-I (5 out of 21 items; 24%).
This suggests that the STAI trait scale may actually be a better
measure of anhedonia than it is of anxiety.
Fourth, the present study does not directly contrast dimensional
versus categorical models of depression, making it premature to
draw strong conclusions about the relative utility of these different
conceptual frameworks. It would therefore be interesting to
compare within the same sample the capacities of categorical
versus dimensional partitioning of depression and anxiety to
demonstrate processing speciﬁcity.
Finally, stronger evidence for the ability to distinguish anxiety
and depression dimensions at the level of cognitive bias would be
provided by showing a double dissociation across two cognitive
measures. For example, future research could usefully examine
whether the anxious-arousal dimension of the MASQ uniquely
predicts variation in some other information processing task.
In conclusion, the present study shows that speciﬁc cognitive
processing biases underlying depression may be more clearly
identiﬁed by viewing the construct in dimensional rather than
categorical terms, and by focusing on variations in the degree of
positive, as opposed to negative, bias. The data provide further
support for dimensional models of mood disorders such as the
tripartite framework (Clark & Watson, 1991) and suggest that
examination of the proﬁles of cognitive processing associated with
these dimensions is a promising direction for future research.
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